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I. INTRODUCTION

Shakespeare did it.' Jonathan Swift did it.2 Mark Twain did it, too.3 The
Simpsons do it all the time, and Saturday Night Live could not exist

* J.D. Candidate, University of Florida Levin College of Law, 2004. I dedicate this Note
to my family and my fiancd, John Lloyds. I would not be here without their encouragement, love,
and support.
1. Michael C. Albin, Beyond Fair Use: PuttingSatire in its Proper Place, 33 UCLA L.
REV. 518, 521 (1985).
2. Id.
3. Id.
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without doing it. Parody and satire have existed and thrived through the
ages, and their subjects have ranged from classical epics to soap operas
and current events.4 Criticism and comment through parody and satire
stimulate society to think critically while, hopefully, providing a good
laugh along the way. Courts have recognized the value of parody in
particular, and have provided "breathing room" for it through the
application of the Fair Use Doctrine.5
The Fair Use Doctrine, section 107 of the Copyright Act, provides in
part that a determination of fair use requires analysis of four factors: (1)
the purpose and character of the use; (2) the nature of the copyrighted
work; (3) the amount and substantiality of the copyrighted work used in
relation to the copyrighted work as a whole; and (4) the effect of the
secondary use upon the potential market for or value of the copyrighted
work.6 The Fair Use Doctrine provides secondary authors and creators
with the privilege of using copyrighted material in a reasonable manner
without the copyright holder's consent.7 Without fair use, the goal of
copyright law - the promotion of intellectual stimulation and knowledge
for public benefit' - would be stifled because copyright holders could
effectively silence would-be critics and others by denying them use of
their copyrighted works. The Fair Use Doctrine thus strives to balance
copyright holders' rights with the objectives of copyright law.
While courts have interpreted the Fair Use Doctrine to provide
protection for parodies, courts have not accorded satire the same
privilege.9 This distinction between parody and satire, however, creates an
unnecessary limitation on the creation of satirical works, is contrary to the
goal of copyright law, and raises important First Amendment concerns. 10

4. Id. at 518.
5. See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569 (1994); Leibovitz v. Paramount
Pictures Corp., 137 F.3d 109 (2d Cir. 1998).
6. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1995).
7. Mary L. Shapiro, An Analysis of the Fair Use Defense in Dr. Seuss Enterprises v.
Penguin, 28 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 1, 7 (1998).
8. See Gregory K. Jung, Dr. Seuss Enterprises v. Penguin Books, 13 BERKELEY TECH. L.J.
119, 123-24 (1998).
9. See Dr. Seuss Enters. v. Penguin Books USA, Inc., 109 F.3d 1394 (9th Cir. 1997).
10. See Jung, supranote 8, at 119-20.
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II. PARODY VERSUS SATIRE

A. What Is the Difference?
Courts often had difficulty distinguishing between parody and satire
because "parody often shades into satire... [and] a work may contain
both parodic and nonparodic elements."" Then, in Campbell v. Acuff-Rose
Music, Inc., the U.S. Supreme Court defined parody as "the use of some
elements of a prior author's composition to create a new one that, at least
in part, comments on that author's works."' 2 Indeed, the wittiest parodies
target not only the parodied material, but also the societal standards of the
audience that made the original popular. 3 In addition, Campbell defined
satire as "commentary [that] has no critical bearing on the substance or
style of the original composition ...

.""

In subsequent decisions courts

have used Campbell's definitions of parody and satire to distinguish
between the two genres."
B. JudicialDifferentiationand Interpretationof Parodyand
Satire in Fair Use Cases
Courts have interpreted Campbell's definitions of parody and satire to
mean that, while a parody uses elements of a prior work to target the prior
work itself, satire uses elements of a prior work to target some other aspect
of society. 6 This distinction has led courts to provide fair use protection
for parody because, as the Campbell Court stated, "[p]arody needs to
mimic an original to make its point.., satire can stand on its own two feet
and so requires justification for the very act of borrowing."' 7
Courts have reasoned that, because copyright owners are not inclined
to grant parodists permission to use their copyrighted work in a manner
that holds the work up to ridicule or criticism, fair use is necessary to
advance the goals of copyright law and to prevent censorship. 8 Courts,
however, deem that copyright owners are likelier to allow use of their
works in satire because satires do not target the copyrighted works
11. Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 581 (1994).
12. Id. at 580.
13. Tyler T. Ochoa, Dr.Seuss, the Juice and FairUse: How the GrinchSilenced a Parody,
45 J. COPYRIGHT SoC'Y U.S.A. 546, 554 (1998).
14. Campbell, 510 U.S. at 580.
15. See Dr. Seuss Enters. v. Penguin Books USA, Inc., 109 F.3d 1394 (9th Cir. 1997);
Leibovitz v. Paramount Pictures Corp., 137 F.3d 109 (2d Cir. 1998).
16. See Ochoa, supra note 13, at 557.
17. Campbell, 510 U.S. at 580-81.
18. See Jung, supra note 8, at 121.
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directly.' 9 Thus, courts have reasoned satires do not need fair use
protection in the same way as parodies.2"

III.

PRESENT STATE OF THE LAW

Modem application of the Fair Use Doctrine to parody and satire has
Music, Inc.2" and Dr.
been shaped by two cases: Campbell v. Acuff-Rose
22
Inc.
USA,
Books
Seuss Enterprisesv. Penguin
A. Campbell v. Acuff-Rose, Inc.
In Campbell, the U.S. Supreme Court considered whether the
petitioners' parody of Roy Orbison's well-known song "Oh, Pretty
Woman" was a fair use.23 The petitioners' song copied the original's first
line but then substituted the remaining lyrics with new ones that alluded
to sexual relations with prostitutes.2 4 The petitioners argued their song was
a parody and, as such, qualified as a fair use under section 107 of the
Copyright Act.25
A unanimous Court found that parody, being a form of comment or
criticism qualified as a fair use.26 In reaching this decision, the Court
analyzed the petitioners' song under the four fair use factors.2 7 In
examining the first factor, the purpose and character of the use, the Court
determined the secondary work must be transformative, "altering the first
"2' Finding
[work] with new expression, meaning, or message ....
parodies are transformative due to their very nature, the Court added "[tihe
threshold question [in determining fair use] . . . is whether a parodic
character may reasonably be perceived. 29 Stretching this broad standard
even further, the Court indicated that when the secondary work poses little
or no risk of market substitution for the original work, even a purely

19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.

See id.
See id
Campbell, 510 U.S.
Dr. Seuss Enters. v.
Campbell, 510 U.S.
Id. at 582.
Id. at 572.
Id. at 579.
Id. at 578.
Campbell, 510 U.S.
Id. at 579, 582.

at 569.
Penguin Books USA, Inc., 109 F.3d 1394 (9th Cir. 1997).
at 571-72.

at 579.

UNFAIR USE

20041

satirical creation, which does not comment on the original, could receive
fair use protection.3"
The Court quickly dispensed with its analysis of the petitioners' work
under the second fair use factor, the nature of the copyrighted work.3
Under this factor, creative works receive broader copyright protection than
factual works.32 Accordingly, it is more difficult to establish a fair use
copying of a creative work than a factual work.3 3 For all intents and
purposes, however, the Court diminished the importance of this factor in
of parodies is to copy known
the case of parodies because the purpose
34
works in order to make their point.
Under the third fair use factor, the amount and substantiality of the
portion used in relation to the copyrighted work as a whole, the Court
reasoned that because parody's humor springs from its imitation of the
original, the parodist might use as much of the copyrighted work as
necessary to "conjure up" the original.35 As such, parodists may need to
copy the copyrighted work's most distinctive feature(s) so the audience
will recognize the copyrighted work as the target of the parody.3 6
Finally, the Court analyzed the fourth fair use factor, the effect of the
use on the potential market for or value of the copyrighted work.37 Here,
the Court found that parodies of creative works usually serve different
market functions than the originals. 38 Therefore, the likelihood of a parody
displacing or substituting the original in the marketplace was not likely.39
The Court examined the Fair Use Doctrine carefully, and rejected the
notion that any one of the fair use factors, by itself, would create a
presumption against fair use.4 ° In doing so, the Court seemingly left the
door open for fair use protection for satiric works. That door was slammed
shut by the Ninth Circuit, however, in Dr. Seuss Enterprises v. Penguin
Books USA, Inc.41

30. Jason M. Vogel, The Cat in the Hat'sLatest Bad Trick: The Ninth Circuit'sNarrowing

ofthe ParodyDefense to CopyrightInfringement in Dr. Seuss Enterprises v. Penguin Books, USA,
Inc., 20 CARDOzO L. REv. 287, 292 (1998) (citing Campbell, 510 U.S. at 581 n.14.)
31. Id. at 293.
32. Id. at 293-94.
33. See id.at294.
34. Id.
35. Campbell, 510 U.S. at 588.

36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.

Id.
Id. at 590.
Id. at 591.
Id.
See Jung, supranote 8, at 126.
See Dr. Seuss Enters. v. Penguin Books USA, Inc., 109 F.3d 1394 (9th Cir. 1997).
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B. Dr. Seuss Enterprises v. Penguin Books USA, Inc.
Although the Ninth Circuit cited Campbell when deciding Dr. Seuss,
it did not follow Campbell's interpretation of the Fair Use Doctrine.42 In
deciding whether the appellants' use was fair, the circuit court based its
ruling on the fact the appellants' creation was a satire, not a parody.43
Appellants, Penguin Books, and Dove Audio, Inc., argued a poetic
account of the O.J. Simpson double-murder trial entitled "The Cat NOT
in the Hat! A Parody by Dr. Juice," did not infringe on Dr. Seuss's
copyright.' Appellants argued that the author had only taken as much of
Dr. Seuss's work as necessary to "conjure up" the original and that Dr.
Seuss's "The Cat in the Hat" was the object of the parody.45
The Ninth Circuit analyzed the appellants' use under the four fair use
factors.4 'To analyze the purpose and character of the appellants' use, the
Ninth Circuit turned to Campbell's definitions of parody and satire. 47 The
circuit court determined that, in order to qualify as a parody and as a fair
use, the appellants' work had to target Dr. Seuss's creations directly.4 The
appellants could not merely use Dr. Seuss's style to comment on the O.J.
Simpson trial without targeting Dr. Seuss's work.49
The circuit court found that, although "The Cat NOT in the Hat!"
mimicked Dr. Seuss's style, it did not ridicule or comment on it.5 0 Thus,
the circuit court did not consider the appellants' work to be a parody."'
Furthermore, the circuit court stated the appellants' work was nontransformative because the appellants merely used Dr. Seuss's style and
illustrations to retell the Simpson saga, without adding new expression,
meaning, or message to Dr. Seuss's works.5 2 As such, the circuit court
found the first fair use factor weighed in favor of Dr. Seuss."
Although the circuit court acknowledged the second fair use factor is
not "terribly significant in the overall fair use balancing. . ." the circuit
court found "the creativity, imagination and originality embodied in "The
54
Cat in the Hat" and its central character tilt[ed] the scale against fair use.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.

See Jung, supra note 8, at 127.
Id.
See Dr.Seuss, 109 F.3d at 1397.
Id.
Id.at 1399.
Id. at 1400.
See id.
See Dr.Seuss, 109 F.3d at 1401.
Id.
See id.
Id.
See id.
Dr. Seuss, 109 F.3d at 1402.
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Under the third fair use factor, the circuit court scrutinized the appellants'
justification for copying Dr. Seuss's works, and noted "the extent of
permissible copying varies with the purpose and character of the use."55
The appellants stated that the book's author used "The Cat in the Hat" to
retell the Simpson story because of the parallels between "The Cat in the
Hat" and the Simpson drama.56 The circuit court, however, was
unconvinced by this argument and found that the third factor weighed in
favor of Dr. Seuss. 7
Lastly, the circuit court considered the fourth factor, the effect of the
appellants' use on the potential market or value of Dr. Seuss's works. 8
Here, the circuit court found that because the appellants' use was nontransformative and commercial, a market substitution was more probable,
and therefore market harm could be more easily inferred. 59
Holding that "The Cat NOT in the Hat!" was not a parody, and thus not
a fair use, the Ninth Circuit unnecessarily narrowed the Campbell holding
and set a precedent inconsistent with the goals of copyright law and with
the Campbell decision itself.
C. Summary of What Courts Hold Today
In Campbell, the Supreme Court stated no single factor could create a
presumption against fair use.6" In doing so, the Court seemed to expand the
fair use defense by focusing on why the Fair Use Doctrine was created,
instead of adopting a rigid application of the four factors.6"
In Dr. Seuss, however, the Ninth Circuit focused on the distinction
between parody and satire and ruled satire would not receive fair use
protection. 2 This decision thus implies that satires are not transformative,
and that defendants will not have any justification for using a copyrighted
work in this way.63 As a result, the Ninth Circuit's decision in Dr.Seuss
"constricts a humorist's ability to legally borrow material from earlier
55. Id.
56. Id. Appellants stated that they chose to use Seuss's "The Cat in the Hat" because, like the
children in that story, Nicole Brown and Ron Goldman were surprised by a "cat" (O.J. Simpson)
who committed immoral acts that were contrary to authority. Additionally, Simpson's attorneys
imposed "tricks" on the public to get them to buy Simpson's defense, leaving a moral dilemma for
the public to deal with. The circuit court did not buy this explanation and characterized it as "pure
schtick." Id. at 1402-03.
57. Id. at 1403.
58. Id.
59. Dr. Seuss, 109 F.3d at 1402-03.
60. See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 578 (1994).
61. See Jung, supranote 8, at 119.
62. See id.
63. See Ochoa, supra note 13, at 589.
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works, seemingly rejecting the broad protection of parodic authorship
championed by the Supreme Court in Campbell."64
IV. WHAT THE LAW SHOULD BE

Dr. Seuss's denial of fair use protection for satires will have a farreaching and negative impact on the entertainment and publishing
industries, and arguably, the public at large.65 Because of the interstate
nature of these industries, creators of nationally distributed "works are
subject to the Ninth Circuit's denial of fair use for satires."66
Consequently, artists, authors, comedians, and other satirists may be
exposed to liability for their creations.67 In turn, this may have a chilling
effect on the creation and distribution of humorous works and will
promote insidious forms of censorship.68
A. FirstAmendment Considerations
The Ninth Circuit's holding in Dr. Seuss can potentially be used by
copyright owners to censor critical, offensive, or comedic speech to the
detriment of the public. The Ninth Circuit's distinction between parodies
that mock copyrighted works and satires that use copyrighted works to
mock something else, allows copyright holders to deny licenses to satiric
works with which they disagree.69 For example, satirists that propose using
copyrighted works to criticize something else in an offensive manner are
not likely to be granted licenses because copyright owners may fear the
use will reflect negatively on their works.70
Dr.Seuss illustrates this point.7" Dr. Seuss Enterprises' motivation for
enjoining publication of "The Cat NOT in the Hat!" was to avoid having
the wholesome reputation of Dr. Seuss's works associated with the sordid
events of the Simpson case.72 Had the authors of the book copied Seuss's
works for another, less controversial purpose, it is likelier Dr. Seuss
Enterprises would have granted a license for the use.

64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.

Vogel, supra note 30, at 303.
See id. at 287.
Id.at 287-88.
Id.
Id.
See Ochoa, supra note 13, at 611.
See Vogel, supra note 30, at 313.
Id.
Id.
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Dr. Seuss demonstrates that leaving creation of satiric works at the
mercy of copyright holders ensures the works will be "less controversial,
provocative, and innovative."" This result neither encourages free

expression nor promotes dissemination of information.
Although creators may argue that use of their works in satires which
are controversial, distasteful, or offensive could lead to tarnishment by
association,74 reputational harm is not an interest that copyright law is
designed to protect." When authors or artists gain fame and fortune
because their work has become popular or part of the social vernacular,
they should be prepared to withstand unfavorable comments or uses of
their works. Indeed, satiric use of a work is often a sign an artistic or
literary creation has achieved public recognition.
Furthermore, tarnishment by association can easily be remedied by
requiring satirists to label their new works as unauthorized satires. If
satirists label their works accordingly, the public will be on notice the
satiric works do not originate from the original authors or creators. Thus,
the public will not associate the original authors with the satires, and the
authors' reputations will remain intact in the public's mind.
Trademark holders are granted a cause of action for tarnishment to
protect their product or service marks from being associated with inferior
or distasteful products or services. Because the public often uses or
purchases a product or service based on its reputation, status, or goodwill,
protection against tarnishment is necessary for trademarks. Conversely, the
public arguably does not consider the reputation of an author or creator
when purchasing or using a creative work. Usually, the consumer's major
consideration is whether the work appeals to his taste, intellect or emotion.
Accordingly, protection from tarnishment is not necessary in copyright
law.
B. Satire as a Fair Use
In Campbell,the Supreme Court rejected the notion that any one of the
four fair use factors creates a presumption against fair use.76 In Dr. Seuss,
however, the Ninth Circuit focused on the first factor, the purpose and
character of the use, and found satires were non-transformative works.77
73. See Jung, supra note 8, at 133.
74. Tarnishment is a form of trademark dilution in which a junior mark's similarity to a
famous mark causes consumers to mistakenly associate the famous mark with the junior user's
inferior product or service. 74 AM. JUR. 2D Trademarks and Tradenames § 116 (2003).
75. Anastasia P. Winslow, Rapping on a Revolving Door: An EconomicAnalysis of Parody
and Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 69 S. CAL. L. REv. 767, 783-84 (1996).
76. Jung, supra note 8, at 126.
77. Id. at 127.
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In finding satires were non-transformative, the Ninth Circuit employed the
first factor to create a presumption against fair use for satires.7"
Consequently, the circuit court failed to consider each factor thoroughly
and simply "went through the motions" in examining each factor.
Moreover, the Ninth Circuit's finding that satires are nontransformative is incorrect because a satire can be as transformative as any
parody. 79 Just because the object of a satire's criticism is something other
than the copyrighted work does not mean that the satirist's creation lacks
innovation or originality. 0
Furthermore, in considering the fourth fair use factor, the Ninth Circuit
did not address how Dr. Seuss would be hurt by a work clearly labeled as
a parody.8" Instead, the circuit court held that because "The Cat NOT in the
Hat!" was non-transformative, market substitution was more certain and
harm could more easily be inferred. 2 However, it seems unlikely readers
would regard "The Cat NOT in the Hat!" as a substitute for the original,
especially since the works target different audiences. While the original
Dr. Seuss work is sold in the children's section of the bookstore, "The Cat
NOT in the Hat!" would likely be sold in the adult humor section.
Furthermore, the fact "The Cat NOT in the Hat!" was labeled as a parody
on its front cover and the author's name was clearly depicted reduced the
possibility readers would confuse or substitute the secondary work for the
original.
The Campbell Court allowed room for fair use protection for satires
when there is "little or no risk of market substitution.... 3 Consequently,
the Ninth Circuit should have provided fair use protection for "The Cat
NOT in the Hat!" because it was unlikely it would serve as a market
substitute for the original work.
C. Economic Considerations
Economic analysis of the Fair Use Doctrine provides ample reasons for
extending fair use protection to satires.8 4 The market failure theory,
proposed by Professor Wendy Gordon of Boston University School of
Law, states fair use should be implemented when "the incentive and
dissemination purposes of copyright conflict and create a market failure." 5
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.

Id.
Id.
Id.
See Jung, supra note 8, at 130.
Id. at 129-30.
See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 581 n.14 (1994).
See Jung, supra note 8, at 125.
Id.
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Usually, a copyright holder will license the use of his work if the
income he could earn by exploiting the work himself would be less than
what the purchaser is offering to pay for the use of the work. 6 In some
instances, however, a copyright holder will refuse to license a work even
if it is economically advantageous to do so. 7 The copyright holder may
not want his work to be criticized or associated with a certain viewpoint
or person, or he may want to keep information from the public. 8 In these
cases, a market failure occurs and, "because the free flow of information
is at stake, a strong case for fair use can be advanced." 9
Alternatively, other commentators, such as Julie Bisceglia, argue fair
use protection for satires is unnecessary because if a copyright holder
refuses to license his work to a satirist, the satirist can find other material
to use.90 Proponents of this argument justify this position by reasoning
that, because satires do not target any particular copyrighted work, satires
are not dependent on the use of any particular work. 9'
This argument, however, fails to consider that certain satiric uses are
likely to be universally offensive to copyright holders. 92 In Dr. Seuss, for
example, Dr. Seuss Enterprises did not want its creations to be associated
with the scandalous Simpson trial. 93 It is reasonable to presume other
copyright holders, such as Disney, Warner Brothers, or Hanna-Barbera,
would also be unwilling to license their respective creations for this
purpose. 94 Indeed, it is unlikely any copyright holder of a children's
cartoon character would be willing to license his creation for a use he
deems unsavory, offensive, or inappropriate.95
Additionally, the assumption a satirist can "shop around" for
copyrighted works to employ in his satire ignores the nature of the creative
process.96 A satirist's ideas are often intertwined with their underlying
source material. 97 Thus, if a satirist is refused the use of a copyrighted
work, he will be unable to apply his idea to a different source without

86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
1997).
94.
95.
96.
97.

Id.
Id.
Id.at 125-26.
Jung, supra note 8, at 126.
See Vogel, supra note 30, at 312.
Id.
Seeid at313.
See generally Dr. Seuss Enters. v. Penguin Books USA, Inc., 109 F.3d 1394 (9th Cir.
Vogel, supra note 30, at 314.
Id. at 314-15.
Id. at 315.
Id.
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materially altering the effect, purpose, or message of the work.98

Consequently, the idea may not be created at all, thus generating a result
is contrary to the goals of copyright law.99
Another concern voiced by critics is that allowing fair use protection
for satire allows those who are unable or unwilling to generate their own
creations the ability to use copyrighted works "to get attention or to avoid
the drudgery in working up something fresh . ...

"100 Although

distinguishing between genuine creators and free riders can sometimes be
difficult, the transformativeness requirement under the first fair use factor
helps weed out the free riders.'0 '
Courts, on a case-by-case basis, could examine whether a work is
transformative enough to merit fair use protection. In performing this
analysis, courts would not be judging the artistic merit or quality of the
work; ' 2 rather, they would only be judging how much the work changes
the copyrighted material or imparts it with new meaning or purpose.
Therefore, even if free riders attempt to label their works as satires to gain
protection under the Fair Use Doctrine, courts, by analyzing the
transformativeness of the work, will be able to enjoin these infringing
uses.

Furthermore, providing fair use protection for satires makes sense
because satires do not displace the copyrighted works in the marketplace,
and thus, do not provide a disincentive to original creators.'0 3 In fact, it is
arguable that satiric works increase demand for the copyrighted works:1'4
The satire may revive interest in a copyrighted work that is no longer as
popular as it once was. After all, satires are not funny if the public does not
recognize the relationship between the satires and the works they are
copying. 105

As Robert P. Merges has proposed,'0 6 "[a]s long as the [satirist] offers
a royalty to the copyright holder that will adequately compensate her, we
should not sanction refusals to license. This is so because in these cases we
know that the refusal to license is based on a noneconomic motive, and we
98. Id.
99. Vogel, supra note 30, at 315.
100. Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 580 (1994).
101. Id. at 586.
102. See Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239,251 (1903) (stating that"[i]t
would be a dangerous undertaking for persons trained only to the law to constitute themselves final
judges of the worth of [artistic creations] .... ").
103. Michael A. Einhorn, Miss Scarlett's License Done Gone!: Parody,Satire,and Markets,
20 CARDozO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 589, 604 (2002).
104. See Albin, supra note 1, at 545.
105. See id.
106. Professor of Law, University of California, Berkeley.
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know that copyright law's preference for dissemination is too strong to
give any credence to such motives in such cases."7
V. POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS/COMPROMISES

In Campbell, the Supreme Court defined satire as "commentary.' ' 0 8 In
turn, the Fair Use Doctrine states "fair use of a copyrighted work.., for
purposes such as criticism [and] comment... is not an infringement of
copyright."' °9 If Campbell's definition of satire is interpreted literally, it
is arguable that satire, as a commentary or critical work, is already covered
under the Fair Use umbrella. The fact the Supreme Court has defined satire
as a form of comment adds credibility to this argument because
commentary is one of the uses specifically enumerated in the Fair Use
Doctrine. '°
Should that argument fail, however, there are other possible ways to
encourage satiric uses while preventing censorship by copyright holders.
One possible solution is to implement a "fared use" system of anticensorship contracts, as suggested by Tom W. Bell.1 I In his article, "Fair
Use vs. Fared Use: The Impact of Automated Rights Management on
Copyright's Fair Use Doctrine," " 2 Bell endorses allowing secondary users
and copyright owners to option out of copyright law and contract under a
fared use system. "3 He proposes the use of anti-censorship contracts which
would commit copyright owners to allow criticism, satire, and other
potentially offensive uses." 4 Users, in turn, would pay market price
licensing fees to copyright owners." 5 Bell argues that, under this system,
fair use litigation would decrease because the uncertainty of what connotes
have free rein
a fair use would be eliminated, and secondary users would
6
to use the copyrighted material however they chose."
107. Robert P. Merges, Are You Making Fun ofMe? Notes on MarketFailureandthe Parody
Defense in Copyright, 21 AIPLA Q.J. 305, 310 (1993).
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A problem with Bell's approach, however, is some copyright holders
will still refuse to license their works for critical or offensive uses, no
matter what the price. These copyright owners would rather forego profits
than allow their works to be used in ways in which they do not approve.
In these instances, Bell argues the Fair Use Doctrine will still provide
some protection for critics and satirists because, as the reasoning in
Campbell demonstrates, "the [F]air [U]se [D]octrine sometimes favors
' However, as Dr.Seuss has shown,
public access over sound economics."117
satire is not one of the uses currently protected by the Fair Use Doctrine;
therefore it is difficult to see how Bell's system would enable satirists to
use works copyright owners refuse to license.
Another possibility is for courts to require unauthorized satirists to pay
copyright holders for actual damages sustained from the use of the
copyrighted work, rather than granting injunctions that prevent
dissemination of the satiric work. This solution would promote the goals
of copyright and still allow copyright holders to receive compensation for
any actual damages. This solution, however, seems a bit problematic
because the amount of actual damages suffered by the copyright holder
might be difficult to quantify or predict. As such, satirists might be
dissuaded from creating satiric works because they may predict (correctly
or incorrectly) the actual damages they may have to pay the copyright
owner will exceed the value of creating the satiric work.
As the foregoing demonstrates, finding a solution that strikes a balance
between the interests of copyright holders and satirists is not an easy task,
but it is one that legislators and courts should continue to work toward.
VI. CONCLUSION

Society benefits when existing material is transformed into new works
that comment on current events or social mores."' If satires are not
allowed to receive fair use protection, the incentive to create satires will
be diminished and fewer satires will be created, much to society's
detriment.119 The Campbell court seemingly tried to prevent this scenario
by adopting a broad standard that allowed protection for satires under the
Fair Use Doctrine.12 ° Unfortunately, the Ninth Circuit narrowed this
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118.
119.
120.

Bell, supranote 112, at 579, 594.
Jung, supranote 8, at 119.
Id. at 133.
See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 581 n.14 (1994).
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standard and, essentially, made fair use protection turn on whether a work
is a satire or a parody. 2 '
The lack of fair use protection for satiric works further hurts the public
because it stifles the creative process and inhibits artistic expression. A
satirist's decision to use a particular work to make a point is not
accidental; the satirist is making an artistic decision in choosing the work
that best suits his purposes.'22 Under current law, unless the copyright
owner is willing to license his work, the lack of fair use protection for
satire deprives satirists of a range of artistic options without a
countervailing social benefit.' 23
For these reasons, courts should reject the Ninth Circuit's holding in
Dr. Seuss and instead adopt the broader standard suggested by the
Supreme Court in Campbell.

121. See Dr. Seuss Enters. v. Penguin Books USA, Inc., 109 F.3d 1394 (9th Cir. 1997).
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123. Id. at 597-98.

